When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology:Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology by Samuelson, Peter L. & Church, Ian M.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of
virtue epistemology
Citation for published version:
Samuelson, PL & Church, IM 2015, 'When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue
epistemology: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology' Philosophical Psychology, vol. 28, no. 8,
pp. 1095-1113. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2014.904197
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1080/09515089.2014.904197
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Philosophical Psychology
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology on
03/04/2015, available online: http://wwww.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09515089.2014.904197
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Running Head: When Cognition Turns Vicious:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When Cognition Turns Vicious: Heuristics and Biases in Light of Virtue Epistemology   
Peter L. Samuelson,  
Fuller Theological Seminary School of Psychology 
Ian M. Church 
Saint Louis University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we explore the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases in light of virtue 
epistemology, specifically highlighting the two major positions—agent-reliabilism and agent-
responsibilism (or neo-Aristotelianism)—as they apply to dual systems theories of cognition and 
the role of motivation in biases. We investigate under which conditions heuristics and biases 
might be characterized as vicious and conclude that a certain kind of intellectual arrogance can 
be attributed to an inappropriate reliance on Type 1, or the improper function of Type 2 cognitive 
processes. By the same token, the proper intervention of Type 2 processes results in the virtuous 
functioning of our cognitive systems (agent-reliabilism). Moreover, the role of motivation in 
attenuating cognitive biases and the cultivation of certain epistemic habits (a search for accuracy, 
being accountable for one’s judgments, the use of rules of analysis, and exposure to differing 
perspectives) points to the tenets of agent-responsibilism in epistemic virtue. We identify the 
proper use of Type 2 cognitive processes and the habits of mind that attenuate biases as 
demonstrations of the virtue of intellectual humility. We briefly explore the nature of these habits 
and the contribution of personality traits, situational pressures, and training in their cultivation.  
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§1. Introduction 
 
     Any account of knowing has, as its starting point, the capacity and desire to know the “truth,” 
through whatever normative criteria the “truth” can be established. Yet, human beings are 
notoriously (and apparently naturally) disposed to over-estimate their capacity to know the truth 
and under-estimate their weaknesses (Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996; Dunning, Leuenberger, & 
Sherman, 1995; Evans, 2007; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Kunda, 1990; Pronin, 
Berger, & Molouki, 2007; Stanovich & West, 1997; Wegener & Petty, 1997). Indeed, the 
evidence is clear that there is a strong tendency even to under-estimate our liability to such biases 
(Pronin & Kugler, 2007)! Furthermore, we are susceptible to all sorts of biases that make 
knowing difficult. For example, we tend to favor evidence or data received early in our inquiries 
(Kruglanski, Dechesne, Orehek, & Pierro, 2009) and we tend to discount the weight of evidence 
that counts against hypotheses we endorse (Nickerson, 1998). Second, evolutionary 
psychologists have offered some intriguing arguments that these dispositions are embedded 
within our cognitive architecture in ways that can systematically lead us to biased thinking, in 
some cases for adaptive reasons (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Our intention here is to apply some 
principles and distinctions from virtue epistemology to the literature on cognitive heuristics and 
biases to gain a better understanding of the promise and perils of our cognitive systems. We will 
examine questions of how and under what circumstances these heuristics and biases can be 
characterized as epistemic vices and how the specific epistemic virtue of intellectual humility 
may help mitigate these vices and steer us toward the fundamental epistemic goal of “truth-
tracking. 1
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§2. Virtue Epistemology 
 
Distinctively, virtue epistemology places intellectual virtue at the heart of knowledge.2 
Virtue epistemologists predominantly focus on the agent himself or herself: on whether 
he or she has the right sort of epistemic character, the right sort of cognitive faculties, 
whether he or she is epistemically virtuous or not. To put it roughly, instead of focusing 
on the beliefs of agents (whether or not they are justified, rational, etc.), virtue 
epistemologists predominantly focus on the agent himself or herself: on whether he or 
she has the right sort of epistemic character, the right sort of cognitive faculties, whether 
he or she is epistemically virtuous or not. To be sure, other theories of knowledge will 
give some account of epistemic virtues, norms, and values—good memory, intellectual 
courage, etc.—but usually ancillary to other epistemic terms or concepts. The radical 
claim that virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge make, however, is that epistemic 
virtues, norms, and values should be the primary focus of epistemology (see Pritchard 
(2005), p. 186; Greco (2010), pp. 17-46). 
Virtue epistemology, so defined, has developed by and large into two distinct schools: 
agent-reliabilism and agent-responsibilism or neo-Aristotelianism. The primary 
difference between the schools is their application of “virtue” terminology. Agent-
reliabilism, being modeled along reliabilist lines, applies virtue terminology in regard to 
faculties, in the same way we might talk about a virtuous knife. In other words, just as we 
might call a knife virtuous if it does what it is supposed to do (cut things, be sharp, etc.), 
agent-reliabilism calls various cognitive faculties such as memory, perception, etc., 
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virtuous insofar as they are reliably functioning the way they are supposed to. That is, 
agent-reliabilism focuses on the reliable functioning (virtuous functioning) of a given 
agent’s cognitive faculties. Neo-Aristotelianism, on the other hand, applies virtue 
terminology in a way with which we are perhaps more familiar: in terms of specific 
character traits such as open-mindedness, intellectual courage, intellectual perseverance, 
etc. 
§2.1. Agent-reliabilism. 
Agent-reliabilism virtue epistemologies developed out of a dissatisfaction with what 
is called process-reliabilism: the view that, to put it roughly, S knows a true proposition p 
if and only if p was formed by a reliable process. There are some serious concerns for 
such a view (e.g., the “generality problem”);3 however, the agent-reliabilists’ primary 
concern was that knowledge ascriptions based on reliable processes do not always 
appropriately involve a given agent: that process-reliabilism seems to allow agents to 
“possess knowledge even though the reliability in question in no way reflects a cognitive 
achievement on their part” (Pritchard, 2005, p. 187).  
Another way that knowledge ascriptions based on reliable processes do not always 
appropriately involve a given agent is in the case of reliable cognitive malfunctions. 
Consider a case originally developed by Alvin Plantinga in which our protagonist has a 
brain lesion that causes him to believe he has a brain lesion: 
Brain Lesion: Suppose . . . that S suffers from this sort of disorder and 
accordingly believes that he suffers from a brain lesion. Add that he has no 
evidence at all for this belief: no symptoms of which he is aware, no 
testimony on the part of physicians or other expert witnesses, nothing. 
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(Add, if you like, that he has much evidence against it, but then add also 
that the malfunction induced by the lesion makes it impossible for him to 
take appropriate account of this evidence.)  Then the relevant [process] 
will certainly be reliable but the resulting belief—that he has a brain 
lesion—will have little by way of warrant for S. (Plantinga, 1993, p. 199)4 
Again, though S’s belief that he has a brain lesion is formed via a reliable process we 
would not ascribe knowledge to it since it is only formed out of a glitch in S’s cognitive 
equipment. It is simply accidental that the brain lesion causes S to form the said belief, 
and as such S had nothing to do with its formation. Though there may be some worries as 
to what constitutes a given person’s cognitive equipment (Why is S’s brain lesion not a 
part of his cognitive equipment? What if he had the lesion since birth?), we nevertheless 
have strong intuitions that beliefs formed as a direct result of a cognitive malfunction 
cannot be knowledge.5 S’s belief that he has a brain lesion cannot be knowledge simply 
because, though formed via reliable process, the agent, S, was not appropriately involved 
in its formation. 
§2.2. Neo-Aristotelianism (Responsibilism). 
Neo-Aristotelianism virtue epistemologies, in contrast, are not modeled after 
reliabilism. Instead of focusing on whether or not a given agent’s epistemic faculties are 
functioning properly and reliable, neo-Aristotelian virtue epistemologists tend to focus 
more on the agent’s epistemic character and epistemic responsibilities. Consider the 
following case:  
Chicken Sexer: Naïve and Reflective are both chicken sexers. Their job is 
to look at baby chickens, determine their genders, and then segregate the 
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chickens accordingly, putting male chicks in one box and female chicks in 
another. Both Naïve and Reflective are equally good at their job; both are 
highly reliable at determining the gender of the baby chickens. There is, 
however, one important difference between them: Naïve has no idea how 
he is able to correctly determine the gender of the chicks; he “just does it.”  
Reflective, on the other hand, is very much aware of how he makes such a 
judgment, by looking for a certain pattern in the chick’s feathers. Does 
Naïve’s ignorance affect his ability to know “that’s a male chick,” “that’s 
a female chick,” etc.?  
Whereas agent-reliabilism virtue epistemologists would generally deny that Naïve’s 
ignorance affects his ability to know (after all, his cognitive equipment is highly reliable), 
neo-Aristotelianism virtue epistemologists would cry foul (or fowl). In focusing on 
epistemic character traits instead of epistemic faculties, neo-Aristotelianism tends to 
“stress that agents should not only exhibit reliable cognitive traits but that they should 
also be in a position to take… reflective responsibility for their true beliefs” (Pritchard, 
2005, pp. 194-195). Naïve may very well have reliable cognitive faculties, but, for the 
neo-Aristotelianism virtue epistemologist that is not enough; in order to be properly said 
to know the gender of the chicks, Naïve needs to exhibit more conscientiousness and take 
more epistemic responsibility.  
This focus on epistemic responsibility ties into another common hallmark of neo-
Aristotelianism, namely, a closer correspondence between epistemology and moral 
philosophy. As we noted earlier, the primary objects of interest for the neo-Aristotelian 
virtue epistemologist are not cognitive faculties (as it was with the agent-reliablist) but 
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rather intellectual character traits (intellectual courageousness, open-mindedness, etc.), 
whether or not a given agent is of the right sort of epistemic character. And being of the 
right sort of epistemic character often means (at the very least) not only reliably reaching 
virtuous ends/teloi but also being virtuously motivated. In other words, in order to be of 
the right sort of epistemic character, not only do you need to be the sort of person who 
regularly hits upon the truth, but you need to hit upon the truth for the right reasons (e.g. 
because you were intellectually courageous as opposed to simply lucky). Not only is neo-
Aristotelianism interested in your veritic reliability, neo-Aristotelianism is interested in 
what sort of person— what sort of epistemic character—you should be. And all of this 
gives epistemology a distinctive moral dimension. Indeed, some neo-Aristotelian virtue 
epistemologists (e.g. Zagzebski, 1996) have even gone so far as to elucidate epistemic 
virtues as a subset of moral virtues. 
The primary difference between agent-reliabilism virtue epistemology and neo-
Aristotelian virtue epistemology that we want to focus on is their divergent accounts of 
intellectual virtue: agent-reliablists roughly explicating intellectual virtue in terms of 
cognitive faculties or cognitive competencies (faculty virtues) and neo-Aristotelians 
roughly explicating intellectual virtues in terms of character traits and motivation 
(character-virtues). Most often, neo-Aristotelianism can be seen as requiring something 
more than the agent-reliabilist: requiring not only that a given agent have reliable 
cognitive faculties (like Naïve in Chicken Sexer), but that they also be of the right sort of 
epistemic character. However, this isn’t necessary the case; neo-Aristotelianism (as we 
are currently conceiving of it) could be seen as simply requiring something else, not 
something more. For example, a neo-Aristotelian could conceivably understand an 
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intellectually virtue—character virtues such as intellectual courage, intellectual 
steadfastness, etc.—in such a way that it did not necessary require reliability; such a neo-
Aristotelian might ascribe knowledge to an agent who manifests such a virtue even when 
the faculties or competencies at play are unreliable. 
 
§3. The Virtuous Knower 
The distinction in virtue epistemology between agent-reliabilism and agent-
responsibilism (or neo-Aristotelianism) provides a useful framework for examining the 
psychological literature on heuristics and biases. On the one hand, we see a concern for 
the reliability (or lack thereof) of our cognitive systems in the literature that deals with 
dual-process theories of cognition, heuristics, and biases (Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, & 
Huh, 1992; Evans, 2007; Gilovich, 1991; Gilovich, et al., 2002; Kahneman, 2011; 
Sloman, 2002; Stanovich, 1999). On the other hand, there is a concern for responsibilism 
reflected in a focus on the role of motivation in cognition and cognitive bias (Chaiken, et 
al., 1996; Dunning, et al., 1995; Kunda, 1990; Pronin, et al., 2007; Wegener & Petty, 
1997). It is not as if those concerned with heuristics and biases ignore the role of 
motivation (Evans, 2007; Stanovich & West, 1997) nor do those primarily interested in 
the role of motivation ignore cognitive mechanisms and capacity (Chaiken, et al., 1996). 
It is rather a matter of emphasis. Nevertheless, these distinctions can serve to provide a 
better understanding of how to best reach the epistemic goal of “truth-tracking” in light of 
the heuristics and biases of our cognitive system.  
§3.1. Reliabilism: Heuristics and Biases. 
§3.1.1. Dual process theories.  
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From a cognitive science perspective, it could be said that if one really knew about 
the systematic heuristics and resulting biases that appear to be a part of our shared 
cognitive mechanisms, one could not help but be intellectually humble (or at least 
humbled). Research into these cognitive heuristics that speed processing and the resulting 
chronic and systematic biases is extensive, not only in the various fields of psychology, 
but in other disciplines as well (see Kahneman, 2011, for one of the latest summaries). 
Out of research into heuristics and biases has grown a number of what are called “dual-
process” theories of human cognition.6  While each theory has different names for and 
different categories assigned to each process, these theories broadly share a distinction 
between fast, automatic, and intuitive processes, called Type 1 (also known as System 1) 
processes, and slow, deliberative, and analytic processes known as Type 2 (also known as 
System 2) processes (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Stanovich, 1999; 
Evans & Stanovich, 2013)7.  
The central characteristic of Type 1 processing is its automaticity – processes that do 
not make much demand on working memory and are not governed by what Evans & 
Stanovich, (2013) call “controlled attention” (p. 236). Because of this, Type 1 processing 
has many correlated (but not necessarily defining) features, such as: rapid processing that 
sometimes does not reach consciousness, associative processing that reacts to stimuli 
with minimal cognitive load, and processing that relies on thoughts that are most readily 
available and dependent on personal experience. Many of the heuristics (mental shortcuts 
that speed processing) and resulting biases are therefore also correlates of Type 1 
processing, though Type 2 processing can also result in systematic biases.8 
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  Type 2 processing is characterized by hypothetical thinking: thinking that is 
“decoupled” from an individual’s representation of reality. This “cognitive decoupling” is 
defined as “the ability to distinguish supposition from belief and to aid rational choices 
by running thought experiments” (Evans & Stanovich, 2013, p. 236). Stanovich  posits 
two “modes” of thinking within Type 2 processing: “algorithmic” and “reflective.” 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich 2009). Although more effortful and requiring more 
working memory than Type 1 processing, the individual’s capacity for engaging these 
modes of thinking that are constitutive of Type 2 processing exists on a continuum such 
that some may execute them with alacrity while others will take more time and 
deliberation. The algorithmic mode of processing suppresses the automatic responses of 
Type 1 processing, decoupling from the current representation of the world, in order to 
compare it to some kind (or kinds) of secondary representation(s). The source of these 
other representations could come from rule-based thinking, from simulations and 
hypotheticals based on experiences (or other knowledge sources), and/or from alternative 
models that are learned, among others. Because the current representation must be held in 
mind while being compared to other possible representations to find the best one 
(requiring effort and a load on working memory) algorithmic processing is highly 
correlated with fluid intelligence, a key factor in intelligence testing (Stanovich, 2009). 
The “reflective” mode of Type 2 processing is characterized by higher forms of cognitive 
regulation and reflects the goals and epistemic values of an individual. Labeled as 
“thinking dispositions” (Stanovich & West, 1997, p. 343) they correlate with such traits 
and tendencies as open-mindedness, thinking through problems and weighing 
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consequences before taking action, and gathering sufficient evidence before making 
conclusions, among others (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
From a virtue reliablist point of view, epistemic vice cannot reside alone in either 
Type 1 or Type 2 processing, though most biases are attributed to an over-reliance on 
Type 1 processing (Evans, 2007; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013). Type 1 processing can be and is quite reliable and often hits on the truth. The 
epistemic vice is found in the breakdown of the relationship between the two types of 
processing and virtue is attained when each plays its appropriate function in the pursuit of 
epistemic goods such as truth, accurate representation of reality, and etc. The relationship 
has been described as “default/interventionist” (Kahneman, 2011; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013), that is, Type 1 processing, because of its efficiency, is the default type of 
processing until and unless Type 2 thinking, which monitors all thought processes, 
determines deeper processing is needed and intervenes to decouple the Type 1 
representation and hypothetically entertain other possible representations in order to find 
the epistemic good (truth, accuracy, knowledge, etc., Stanovich, 1999, 2009, Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). If Type 2 processing is lazy, negligent, distracted, or overly focused on 
the self, biases will go unnoticed (Kahneman, 2011). Indeed, there is broad consensus 
that biases are effectively reduced through effortful, deliberate, analytic, Type 2 
processes (Evans, 2007; Kahneman, 2011; Sloman, 2002; Stanovich & West, 1997; 
Wilson, Centerbar, & Brekke, 2002). That the automatic Type 1 processing does not hit 
upon the truth is not epistemically vicious in and of itself, but would be if Type 2 
processing, for whatever reason, fails to correct or amend the Type 1 representation when 
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it is distorted. Both need to fail in their proper function for an epistemically vicious 
result.9  
Stanovich (2009) has built a basic taxonomy that lays out thinking errors and biases 
along virtue reliablist lines. First there are the “cognitive miser” errors (p. 74-75) which 
means, as the name implies, the cognitive system (specifically Type 2 thinking) did not 
expend enough resources by 1) failing to de-couple and therefore going with Type 1 
processing even though biased, 2) decoupling but failing to override Type 1 processing 
when it should have been or 3) decoupling but perseverating on only one alternative 
representation when more comparisons are needed. In each case Type 2 thinking did not 
perform its proper function in the pursuit of epistemic goods. Then there are “mindware” 
problems, which can be manifested as a “mindware gap,” (p. 75) that is, a gap in the 
learning necessary for Type 2 processing to recognize the need for decoupling and further 
reflection. This can include gaps in the knowledge of rules, of procedures and strategies 
for thinking, of probability, of specific domain knowledge, among others. Then there is 
“mindware contamination (p. 76)” which includes learned rewards and punishments for 
not engaging in decoupled thinking, using representations of the world from a egocentric 
perspective in decoupling, and using knowledge structures that are wrong or misguided in 
decoupling. As the labels cognitive miser” and “mindware” imply, the cognitive system 
is not working virtuously and is prone to epistemic vice due to improper functioning such 
as failing to engage Type 2 processing when necessary, gaps in knowledge, and 
contamination of mental representations used in Type 2 processing.   
The heuristics of Type 1 thinking evaluate ideas from within one’s own perspective 
and therefore favor ideas that are readily accessible, easily discerned, and conforms to 
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prior experience (Dunning, Meyerowitz,  & Holzberg, 2002;  Sanna, Schwarz, & Stocker, 
2002; Pronin et al., 2007; Stanovich & West, 2007). Type 2 processing can also favor 
what one already believes, knows, and intuits even as it decouples from Type 1 
representations (Stanovich , 2009, calls this “egocentric processing,” p. 78). While in 
many instances this self-reliant thinking is adequate, problems and biases arise when 
reliance on what one knows and intuits does not provide enough information (or the right 
kind of information) for the task, which, in turn, produces biased judgments. Many of 
these biases are well known and well documented. There are (among others): 
• The confirmation bias: The tendency to seek confirmation for opinions and beliefs 
already held and to ignore disconfirming evidence (Nickerson, 1998). Even 
academic psychologists are not immune. They rate studies with findings 
consistent with their prior beliefs more favorably than studies with conclusions 
inconsistent with their beliefs (Hergovich, Schott, & Burger, 2010).  
• The hindsight bias: People’s predictions of events are remembered as more 
accurate after the fact than they really were. In predicting the outcome of the 
German Bundestag elections of 1998, subjects remembered—after the election—
their predictions 4 months earlier as 25% closer to the actual results than they had 
originally predicted (Blank, Fischer, & Erdfelder, 2003). 
• The anchoring and adjustment heuristic: Cognitive anchors affect people’s 
judgments under conditions of uncertainty. When asked to estimate when George 
Washington was elected president, participants began with a known date  (the 
Declaration of Independence, 1776) and adjusted from there to the unknown date 
(Epley & Gilovich, 2002). 
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• The my-side bias: People are biased toward their own opinions and point of view 
when evaluating evidence, generating evidence and testing hypotheses, regardless 
of their level of intelligence. They also have trouble assessing conclusions that 
conflict with their knowledge of the world, However, when explicitly instructed 
to consider other points of view, people high in general intelligence and 
possessing certain thinking dispositions (e.g. actively open-minded thinking) 
exhibited less biased thinking (Stanovich & West, 2007). 
 §3.2. Responsibilism: Motivation, Goals, and Values in Cognition. 
As noted above, responsibilism (neo-Aristotelian virtue epistemology) is not as 
interested in the reliability of our cognitive mechanism (compared to the reliabilists) as 
they are in whether or not a given agent has of the right sort of epistemic character. A 
person with the right sort of epistemic character will not only reliably reach virtuous ends 
but must also be virtuously motivated. Psychologists, too, are interested in epistemic 
motivation and the goals and values of cognition. Many of them use dual system theories 
of cognition as their framework. There is some disagreement, however, about whether 
these are character traits in the sense that they are an enduring part of one’s personality, 
or whether these traits are largely situational, i.e. dependent on the agent’s state. 
In light of a cognitive system that is often times is prone to biases because of a failure 
to of Type 2 processing to decouple from Type 1 representation when necessary, one 
avenue of exploration into virtuous knowing would be to investigate processes and 
actions that attenuate biases. From a virtue-responsibilist point of view, the vice of 
cognitive bias lies in this inability (or perhaps refusal) to decouple from the singular 
representation of reality that Type 1 processing provides. In this way, the cognitive 
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system, in its insistence to stay with Type 1 representations and to not make algorithmic 
or hypothetical comparisons to other possible representations, could be characterized as 
“self-centered.” Therefore, reducing or eliminating these biases might involve some kind 
of engagement with an “other;” someone or something that “de-centers” the cognitive 
system, engages decoupling, and entertains different ways of thinking and other points of 
view. Indeed a review of the literature reveals several types of “other-centered” thinking 
as effective techniques for reducing biases: the use of rules of analysis (a process used by 
many others to arrive at a more consensual judgment), a search for accuracy (representing 
reality that is shared by others), a need to be accountable for one’s judgments (to defend 
one’s thoughts to another), and exposure to differing perspectives (seeing things from 
another’s point of view). The presence or absence of these factors often hinges on 
motivation and the epistemic goals and values of thinking agents and thus favors the 
responsibilist or neo-Aristotelian account of virtue epistemology. 
§3.2.1. Rule-based thinking. 
Directing one’s attention to processes, objective criteria, and rules of analysis can aid 
in reducing systematic bias. For example, when personal traits are ambiguous (e.g., 
whether or not one is intelligent or a good driver), people draw on idiosyncratic 
definitions of traits and abilities to assess themselves as better than average at a certain 
task or trait. Once given criteria of judgment, however, they are more accurate in their 
assessment relative to their peers (Dunning, et al., 2002). Evans (2007) demonstrates that 
when questions are asked in a way that engages analytic reasoning processes, biases are 
reduced. For example, his research has shown that the usual matching bias evident in the 
original form of the Wason card selection task is eliminated when the rule is highlighted 
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over the surface features, making the need to falsify in order to rightly complete the task 
explicit. Stanovich (1999) has noted that many of the tasks involved in heuristics and 
biases depend on an understanding and mastery of normative rules of thought (logic and 
statistics) which is the purview of the algorithmic function of Type 2 processing. Those 
attuned to rule-based, algorithmic thinking perform better on these tasks. Understanding 
can come through training (as the research reported in Stanovich (1999) demonstrates), 
through the framing and presentation of the problem (Evans, 2007), through cognitive 
ability (high analytic reasoning capability) and through the possession of certain open and 
flexible thinking dispositions that “serve the ends of epistemic rationality” (Stanovich & 
West, 1998, p. 180).  
§3.2.2. Accuracy and accountability. 
Situations that call for accuracy in judgment promote slower, more deliberative 
thinking. Kunda (1990), in an analysis of the work on accuracy-driven reasoning, 
concluded that when “people are motivated to be accurate, they expend more cognitive 
effort on issue-related reasoning, attend to relevant information more carefully, and 
process it more deeply, often using more complex rules” (p. 481). For example, when 
people know they will be judged on accuracy, they are more accurate in evaluating their 
own abilities (Armor & Taylor, 2002). However, Petty, Wegener, & White (1998) 
caution that motivation for accuracy may not be enough to attenuate bias, but that bias 
can also occur in the correction process. Nevertheless, Kruglanski & Mayseless (1987) 
report that a high need for accuracy (what they call a heightened fear of invalidity) 
motivates people to seek comparison with those who disagree with them. The focus on 
accuracy, then, invites the thinking agent into a more “humble” epistemic posture 
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because (a) that agent may realize that he or she has a less than complete understanding 
and needs to seek more information, (b) it helps the agent to focus on what others might 
think of the same phenomenon, and (c) it will focus the agent on objective criteria about 
the phenomenon. The focus on accuracy and accountability emphasizes the situational 
factors that attenuate a generalized human tendency toward biased thinking. 
Having to defend one’s thoughts and judgments to others might include the need to be 
accurate, but also injects the notion of accountability, which promotes a more careful 
analysis of one’s thoughts and arguments. Mercier & Sperber (2011), in a thorough 
examination of the many abstract reasoning tasks that are used to measure heuristics and 
biases, demonstrate that when the same reasoning tasks are set in the context of making 
an argument or defending a position, the reasoning of the participants is less biased and 
more complete. Moreover, they make the case that the confirmation bias, in the context 
of producing arguments to convince others of the rightness of one’s beliefs, can produce 
a “cognitive division of labor.”  Because participants in a disagreement want to bring the 
best evidence they have found to support their beliefs, the confirmation bias serves them 
well collectively: together two disagreeing parties will tend to marshal relevant evidence 
in favor of their favoring positions. However, in the context of a discussion with others 
over the best evidence, or the best argument (the process of evaluating an argument, not 
its production), the confirmation bias no longer serves them well. Therefore, this 
“cognitive division of labor” works in the context of disagreement provided (and this is 
an important caveat) people have “a common interest in the truth” and go through the 
hard work of evaluating and selecting the best argument with the best evidence. Most 
people are quite good at the task of evaluating the best argument, both at the individual 
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and group level, when motivated to do so. When held accountable under a time pressure, 
however, people exhibit the primacy effect, giving more weight to information they 
received first (Kruglanski, et al., 2009). 
The key to mitigating bias may be in taking the position of  “a common interest in the 
truth.”  A study by Stanovich & West (1997) on the capacity of the individual to evaluate 
an argument fairly in light of previously held beliefs is informative in this regard. 349 
college students completed a measurement called the Argument Evaluation Test (AET) in 
which they first indicated the strength of their beliefs regarding certain social and 
political issues and then (later in the testing process) evaluated the quality of the 
arguments of a fictitious individual on these same issues. Their analysis resulted in two 
groups, one with a high reliance on argument quality and a low reliance on prior belief 
and another with a low reliance on argument quality and a high reliance on prior belief. 
They compared the mean scores of the two groups on various measures including a 
composite score that measured “Actively Open-minded Thinking” (AOT) that indicated 
openness to belief change and cognitive flexibility. Those who showed a high reliance on 
argument quality by relying less on prior beliefs scored significantly higher on the AOT 
composite scale. This open and flexible thinking disposition held even when they 
controlled for cognitive ability.10  Stanovich & West (1997) assert that these thinking 
dispositions can provide information about an individual’s epistemic goals and values. 
For example, a disposition such as the willingness to change beliefs reflects the goal of 
getting as close to the truth as possible, or the disposition to carefully evaluate arguments 
indicates a value for accuracy. It might be fair to infer that those with a high reliance on 
argument quality had the epistemic goal of “a common interest in the truth.”  Thinking 
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dispositions function more like enduring traits that are less influenced by varying 
circumstances, though they are seen as “malleable” and therefore teachable skills (Baron, 
1994). 
§3.2.3. Perspective taking. 
One aspect of an open and flexible thinking disposition that helps mitigate biases is 
the capacity to weigh evidence for and against a strongly held belief, including the 
opinions and beliefs of others who hold a position different from one’s own. This 
requires a certain capacity for perspective taking: a movement from the focus on one’s 
own thoughts to include the perceptions, thoughts and ideas of others. This adjustment 
can be as simple as considering alternative points of view and as complex as trying to 
assess another person’s thoughts. Studies have found that asking people to consider the 
possibility that competing hypotheses are true is sufficient to undo the bias of one-sided 
thinking (Sedikides, Horton, & Gregg, 2007; Wilson, et al., 2002). The issue can be 
complicated, however, by the primacy effect. Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen (2001) 
demonstrated that the order of the presentation of other points of view can impact de-
biasing. The confirmation bias was stronger in a situation in which subjects were exposed 
to other points of view sequentially and lessened when subjects had access to all the 
points of view simultaneously. The sequential presentation encouraged the subjects to 
remain focused on their prior commitments, whereas those who had the information 
presented simultaneously were able to compare their beliefs to many points of view. This 
might lead to the conclusion that entertaining more alternatives would help attenuate bias, 
but Sanna, et al. (2002) have shown that in the case of hindsight bias more is not better. 
Subjects who were asked to produce 12 reasons why the British-Gurka war could have 
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come out differently were more susceptible to hindsight bias than those who produced 
only two reasons. They surmise that the difficultly of coming up with 12 counterfactual 
reasons makes alternative outcomes seem less likely and the actual outcome more so and 
puts the availability heuristic into play. However, those who came up with only two 
reasons performed as well as the control group who did not know the outcome of the war. 
Thus, in moderation, considering a counterfactual perspective helped attenuate hindsight 
bias. 
Often bias is the result of a lack of perspective taking. Birch & Bernstein (2007) 
propose that a similar inability to take the perspective of naïve others is at the core of 
both children who are unable to successfully complete Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks and 
adults who exhibit hindsight bias. In each case the “knower” and naïve other do not share 
the same information because the knower is biased by the primacy of current knowledge 
and belief. On the other hand, perspective taking itself also is prone to bias. When 
assessing the behavior of others, people exhibit what is known as the correspondence 
bias, which is the tendency to make dispositional inferences from behaviors that can be 
mostly explained by the situations in which they are found. For example, when observing 
a person at a party that does not talk very much, you assume she is shy. Later you find 
out she is from another country and not very confident in her English speaking ability. A 
few months later you meet her again at a party and she is very talkative, even extroverted. 
It was being in foreign country without speaking the language that made her look shy at 
first, when, in fact, she has a disposition toward extroversion. This comes about, in part, 
because of what Gilbert & Malone (1995) call an “egocentric assumption” which 
includes an inability to “put (oneself) in someone else’s epistemic shoes” (p. 26, i.e. 
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construe the situation as the actor does). However, when specifically prompted to see a 
situation as another sees it, egocentric biases can be attenuated. For example, Todd, 
Bodenhausen, Richeson, & Galinsky (2011) found that subjects who performed a 
perspective taking task showed less implicit or automatic racial bias (as measured by the 
personalized evaluative race IAT) than a control group that did not engage in perspective 
taking. One possible explanation the researchers offered was that since the self is the 
anchor in evaluating others, lessening the distance between the self and the person of 
another race through perspective taking allowed for more positive evaluations of the 
person of another race.  
 
§4. Heuristics and Biases as Intellectual Arrogance. 
In a limited sense we might say that heuristics and biases exhibit the vice of 
“intellectual arrogance” (IA) because, they result, in part, from an inability to ‘decouple’ 
from Type 1 representations and the thinker remains unable to leave his or her own 
perspective. There are also instances when decoupling occurs and Type 2 thinking is 
engaged but it remains focused on the self, resulting in egocentric thinking (Stanovich, 
2009). In both cases, thought remains “self-centered.” We see this exhibited in many of 
the biases identified in the literature. The self- centeredness is found in the general human 
tendency to use the self as an anchor against which the other is compared and the world is 
known (Dunning, Krueger, & Alicke, 2005; Guenther & Alicke, 2010). We are biased 
toward that which comes fastest and most easily to mind, (availability or representative 
heuristic, Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), which is often thoughts about the self 
(Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 2002; Kruger, 1999). We over-rely on our 
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introspections, considering the more objective, behavioral facts as secondary (Pronin & 
Kugler, 2007). We are biased toward self-enhancement and justify our beliefs and 
actions—even altruistic action—in terms of self-interest, (Miller, 1999). Even beyond the 
“better-than-average” effect, our thinking is biased toward the self in comparison to 
others (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). This is not mere egoism, for while we tend to think of 
ourselves as “better than average,” we can also think of ourselves as below average in 
comparison to others (Kruger, 1999). We consider our thoughts as representative of a 
reality that is shared by others (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross & Ward, 1996). Moreover, 
we tend to assume too early that our memories, judgments, intuitions, and beliefs are 
sufficient for the epistemic task at hand (Evans, 2007). 
Self-centered thinking is not, in-and-of-itself, IA. Indeed, it is only natural that our 
own experiences are going to be more readily available to us as evidence. It can only be 
characterized as arrogance when self-centered thinking is not sufficient to hold a belief in 
accordance with the evidence, if we count on what we know more than we ought.11  
Normally, Type 1 processing provides the information needed to make the decisions and 
judgments necessary to successfully navigate life (Evans, 2007; Stanovich, 1999). It does 
so with great efficiency. The problem comes when Type 1 processes are not sufficient 
and thinking is not decoupled from Type 1 representations: when it is necessary to move 
beyond what one immediately knows, believes, and/or remembers to incorporate other 
information. That is, when Type 2 processes intervene and, in a slower, deliberative, and 
sequential manner, bring more information to bear until the mind is satisfied that it knows 
what it needs to know. That information can come from within the self, by accessing 
memories which broaden the data or evidence at hand, it can come from others who offer 
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a different perspective, and it can come from the application of rules of analysis that help 
determine what is sufficient to make a judgment. Type 2 processing, however, is also 
prone to bias because of the sequential nature of its processing, taking up one mental 
model at a time until a sufficient one is found (Evans, 2007). Some biases, like those that 
occur from framing effects, can be the result of a Type 2 processing that has decoupled, 
but is focused on a singular model from a source outside the self that stimulates all other 
subsequent thought (serial associative cognition with a focal error, Stanovich, 2009). This 
might be best characterized as an exhibition of intellectual diffidence (ID)– the opposite 
of IA because it is too ‘other’ focused–yet still missing mark of holding a belief with the 
proper firmness that the belief warrants.12 
The examples of behaviors and techniques noted above that help to reduce biases 
share the common aspect of “de-centering” (decoupling) thought to include and consider 
the “other” through the use of rules of reasoning, a concern for accuracy, a need for 
accountability, and taking the perspective of others. One common theme in the literature 
is the role of motivation in de-biasing thought (Chaiken, et al., 1996; Dunning, et al., 
1995; Kunda, 1990; Wilson, et al., 2002), pointing to the conclusion correcting biases is 
an effortful process that requires some kind of motivation to overcome the self-centered 
tendencies of our cognitive system. In this way, it reflects the neo-Aristotelian 
(responsibilist) notion of epistemic virtue: that it must be consciously practiced to 
overcome our more arrogant cognitive tendencies and avoid the possibility of being too 
diffident to others by giving in too easily or not evaluating the other’s position rigorously. 
§4.1. Avoiding and mitigating biases with intellectual humility. 
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We propose that the set of traits and dispositions that best avoid the vices of IA and 
ID as we have defined them and help mitigate biases (open-mindedness, gathering all 
available evidence, concern for accuracy and accountability, among others) is best 
characterized by the epistemic virtue of intellectual humility (IH). We have seen evidence 
that epistemic characteristics and behaviors that might contribute to IH are both 
influenced by situations (inducing IH as a state, Armor & Taylor, 2002) and part of an 
individual’s thinking dispositions (which makes IH look more trait-like, Stanovich & 
West, 1997, Stanovich, 2009). If IH requires the effortful control of Type 2 thinking 
processes, it may be hard to defend IH as a trait that is held with any stability, making IH 
appear more state than trait. Never-the-less, there are individual differences in the 
capacity for effortful control and the characteristics that lend themselves to IH that are 
more stable and trait-like. Part of the resolution might be found in Stanovich’s tri-partite 
mind (Stanovich, 2009, Evans & Stanovich, 2013), which posits an autonomous mind 
(Type 1 processes), an algorithmic mind, and a reflective mind (two aspects of Type 2 
processes). The algorithmic mind, being highly correlated with general intelligence, is 
more trait-like in its manifestations, while the reflective mind is defined by state-like 
thinking dispositions (though these can also show trait-like individual differences in 
certain conditions [see Stanovich & West, 2007]). Either way, responsibilist virtue 
epistemology would recognize that IH can be developed, enhanced, and trained. On the 
one hand, those low in the trait could cultivate the habits of IH through practice (while 
those high in the trait could grow in expertise through the same means). On the other, 
creating the right pressures and circumstances (accountability, etc.) could induce IH (or 
attenuate IA and ID).13  Like the state/trait debate in personality and social psychology, 
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IH is neither simply state or trait but result of the complex interaction of person and 
environment that is a part of all personality development (Fleeson, 2004). 
From a dual-process point of view, another empirical question worthy of investigation 
is whether or not “other-centered” thinking could become a part of Type 1 cognition, i.e., 
whether or not it could become a habit of thought which is automatic, effortless, and 
intuitive. Some indications in the literature suggest that it can. For example, the short 
intervention in perspective taking outlined above resulted in implicit and unconscious 
correction of racial bias (Todd, et al., 2011). Thinking dispositions and algorithmic 
thinking can be trained and practiced to automaticity (Stanovich, 2009).  The literature on 
moral expertise could also yield clues about the development of habitual, “other-
centered” thinking. Using insights from dual process theory, Narvaez (2008) sees both 
systems at work in the development of moral expertise noting that expertise is trained by 
immersing novices in environments that build up their intuitions and by giving explicit 
guidance on how to solve problems in the given domain. The training of moral intuitions 
begins even in the early experiences of attachment and continues through novice-to-
expert instruction. Drawing on expertise training in other fields, Narvaez notes that in 
such training “perceptions are fine-tuned and developed into chronically accessed 
constructs, applied automatically; action schemas are honed to high levels of 
automaticity” (p. 313). Like developing any virtuous habit, intentionality on the part of 
parents, teachers, and mentors to train habits such as open-mindedness, accurate 
representation of reality, and the search for the best evidence in a systematic and 
sustained manner would contribute to the “chronic accessibility” of IH. 
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§5. Conclusion 
While it may seem as though the virtue of intellectual humility might be best 
explicated in terms neo-Aristotelianism virtue epistemology’s character traits, there is no 
obvious reason why our concepts of intellectual humility cannot be explicated the terms 
of agent-relaibilism virtue epistemology as well. Presumably, any robust, full account of 
intellectual virtue will have to account for both cognitive faculty-virtues as well as 
character trait-virtues; whether one does this along agent-reliabilism lines or neo-
Aristotelianism lines could be, to some extent, a matter of emphasis. For a person can 
hold a belief more strongly (or weakly) than warranted due to biases inherent in our 
cognitive systems, or due to some lack of character, just as a person can exhibit virtuous 
knowing via the proper functioning of one’s cognitive system or through the exercise of a 
virtuous character.  
Straightforwardly, those of us interested explicating intellectual humility in light of 
the function (or malfunction) of our cognitive faculties might take special interest in the 
model of intellectual virtue afforded by agent-reliabilism. Conversely, those of us 
interested in explicating intellectual humility as something more like a character trait 
might take special interest in the model of intellectual virtue afforded by neo-
Aristotelianism. Either way, it can be defined as holding a belief as firmly as it is 
warranted, whether such warrant is derived from the proper functioning of our cognitive 
systems or whether such warrant is brought about by the exercise of a particular way of 
knowing (a trait).  
Within either framework of virtue epistemology, we argue that the epistemic virtue of 
intellectual humility is mostly found in the conscious exercise of Type 2 thinking and can 
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come about in a manner consistent with either mode of virtue epistemology: through the 
proper collaboration of Type 1 and Type 2 processes (agent-reliabilism) or through the 
conscious practice of applying Type 2 thinking when appropriate (neo-Aristotelians). The 
literature investigating ways to attenuate cognitive biases suggests at least four habits that 
would lend themselves to cultivating intellectual humility and lead away from intellectual 
arrogance: the use of rules of analysis, a search for accuracy, being accountable for one’s 
judgments, and exposure to differing perspectives. Certain traits appear to create a natural 
disposition toward intellectual humility and other forms of virtuous knowing (i.e., the 
need for cognition, [Cacioppo & Petty, 1982], active open minded thinking [Stanovich & 
West, 1997], the need for closure [Kruglanski, 1990], and those traits from factor models 
of personality that relate to IH such as open-mindedness, conscientiousness, and humility 
[Ashton & Lee, 2005; McCrae & Costa, 1997]). These traits can be trained, enhanced, 
and cultivated. Just as habits play a role in cultivating any virtue, habits of the mind can 
bring about intellectual humility and other epistemic virtues. They serve to curb the vice 
of intellectual arrogance, even in the face of a cognitive system that can be prone to 
biased thinking. Perhaps our cognitive system is not in and of itself “vicious,” but it may 
take conscious effort and virtuous habits of the mind not to make it so.  
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1 Some philosophers worry that psychological theory threatens the viability of virtue epistemology 
(Olin & Doris 2013; Alfano 2012). While not aimed at engaging with that literature, this paper does 
elucidate a surprising harmony between the philosophical and psychological research—a harmony that can, 
if anything, help dissolve such worries.       
2 To be sure, one need not be committed to virtue epistemology per se to account for intellectual virtues 
– someone can account for intellectual virtues without any special loyalty to virtue epistemology – 
nevertheless, virtue epistemology, naturally enough, offers the most robust and flourishing accounts of 
intellectual virtue in the philosophical literature. 
 3 As Earl Conee and Richard Feldman noted in “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism” (1998), 
“A fully articulated [process] reliabilist theory must identify with sufficient clarity the nature of the 
processes it invokes. In doing so, the theory confronts what has come to be known as 'the generality 
problem'” (1998, p. 1). 
4 Also quoted in Pritchard (2005), p. 188. 
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5 See Pritchard (2005), p. 188; Greco (2003), pp. 356-357. 
6 See chapter 7 of Evans (2007) for a comparative analysis. 
7  Recently the language of “systems” has been abandoned by some cognitive scientists in favor of 
using Type 1 and Type 2 to distinguish these cognitive processes because they do no represent a single 
system but the many cognitive systems and neural networks that support each type of thinking (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). 
8  Included in type 1 processing are implicit learning and conditioning, decision-making rules and 
principles that are so well practiced as to be automatic, and the regulation of behavior by emotions. 
Stanovich (2009) has given the name TASS (The Autonomous Set of Systems) to these processes because 
they “respond automatically to triggered stimuli [and are not] under the control of the analytic processing 
system (System 2)” (p. 57). 
9  And this means that according to the credit theory of knowledge espoused by some reliabilist virtue 
epistemologists (see Greco 2009; Greco 2010; Greco 2012), Type 1 cognition can produce credit-worthy 
beliefs—beliefs we would deem knowledge—so long as it is employed in a context where it is generally 
adequate to its task. Also see Axtell forthcoming.  
10 As measured by SAT scores and a test of verbal ability, though cognitive ability was also a unique 
and independent predictor of argument evaluation performance.  
11 Since much of Type 1 processes are unconscious, we are not accusing the agent of being willfully 
arrogant. Instead arrogance means to preference the self as a source of information, when what the self 
knows, by itself, does not provide enough for believing in accordance with the facts, whether the agent is 
conscious of this preference or not.  
12 We have defined elsewhere that intellectual humility as a virtuous mean that can be defined as 
“holding a belief with the firmness warranted,” which avoids the vice of intellectual arrogance (holding 
your belief too firmly when it is not warranted) on the one hand, and intellectual diffidence (holding a 
belief too loosely or giving in to another’s belief too soon) on the other (Authors, 2012).  
13 Insofar as research into heuristics and biases helps us understand IH, it is useful to think of IH as the 
absence or the opposite of IA. As we state above in the introduction, we hold the view that IH is not simply 
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the opposite, or absence of something (like IA) but that a robust definition should include positive 
attributes.  
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